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Comments
General Problems of Life Insurance
in Estate Planning
Because life insurance is one of the basic estate planning tools,
and because the modern estate planner must also be a tax adviser,
it is important that those general practitioners who plan estates
have an understanding of the "transfer tax" treatment of life in-
surance. This paper is intended to acquaint the reader with the
treatment afforded life insurance by the Federal Estate Tax; it does
not represent an attempt to probe deeply into any of the various
facets of that subject. If the reader, be he advocate or estate plan-
ner, is given a better understanding of the nature of some of the
problems in this area, this paper will have served its intended
purpose.
Basically the estate tax treatment of life insurance under the
1954 Internal Revenue Code is affected by section 2042. 1 This sec-
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042. The value of the gross estate shall in-
clude the value of all property-
(1) RECEIVABLE BY THE EXECUTOR.-To the extent of the amount
receivable by the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the
decedent.
(2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER BENEFICIARIES.- To the extent of
the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies
on the life of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at
his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or
in conjunction with any other person. For purposes of the preceding
sentence, the term "incidents of ownership" includes a reversionary interest
(whether arising by the express terms of the policy or other instrument or
by operation of law) only if the value of such reversionary interest exceeded
5 percent of the value of the policy immediately before the death of the
decedent. As used in this paragraph, the term "reversionary interest" in-
cludes a possibility that the policy, or the proceeds of the policy, may
return to the decedent or his estate, or may be subject to a power of dis-
position by him. The value of a reversionary interest at any time shall
be determined (without regard to the fact of decedent's death) by usual
methods of valuation, including the use of tables of mortality and actuarial
principles, pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his
delegate. In determining the value of a possibility that the policy or the
proceeds thereof may be subject to a power of disposition by the decedent,
such possibility shall be valued as if it were a possibility that such policy
or proceeds may return to the decedent or his estate.
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tion is one of the fourteen sections 2 which describe the Gross Es-
tate, from which the allowable exemptions and deductions are
subtracted to determine the value of a decendent's Taxable Estate.
Thus, section 2042 describes the conditions under which the pro-
ceeds of insurance of the life of the decedent will be included in
his gross estate just as the other sections describe the inclusion of
other kinds of property.3 Furthermore, as may be inferred, these
sections are inter-related and proceeds of life insurance which are
not includible under section 2042 may be includible under some
other section. But, before examining this inter-relation, let us sub-
ject section 2042 to closer scrutiny.
I. THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 2042
At the outset we should note that the 2042 treatment of life
insurance is significantly different than that afforded life insur-
ance under the 1939 Code, and that this change affects only the
gross estates of those persons dying on or after August 17, 1954.
Under Section 811 (g) of the 1939 Code, life insurance proceeds were
taxable (a) if the proceeds were receivable by the insured's estate,
(b) if the insured paid any of the premiums or, (c) if the insured
exercised any of the incidents of ownership either alone or in con-
junction with another person. To the dismay of the Treasury De-
partment,4 section 2042 of the 1954 Code eliminated the premium
payment test. However, "to place life insurance in an analogous
position to other property,"5 Congress provided that a reversionary
interest which exceeded five percent of the value of the policy
would be considered an incident of ownership. Thus, under section
2042 of the 1954 Code, life insurance proceeds are included in the
insured's gross estate if (a) the proceeds are receivable by the in-
sured's executor, (b) the insured possessed any of the incidents of
ownership exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any
2 Int. Rev. Code 1954, §§2031-2044.
3 For the general effect of those other sections, see Proposed Regs., §
20.2031-1 (1956). On October 22, 1956, the Internal Revenue Service an-
nounced the Estate Tax Regulations proposed under the 1954 Code. 1956
Int. Rev. Bull., No. 43, at 5.
4 Waldo, Life Insurance and Annuities under the 1954 Revenue Code,
1955 U. Ill. L. Forum 380, 397.
5 H. R., No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 316 (1954); accepted in full Senate
Committee of Finance, S. Rep. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 124 (1954).
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other person, or (c) the insured possessed a reversionary interest
which exceeded five percent of the value of the policy.6
A. PRELIMINARY PROBLEMS
To understand section 2042, it is necessary to know what is
meant by the term insurance. Section 20.2042-1 of the proposed
regulations states that the term insurance refers to life insurance
of every description, including death benefits paid by fraternal so-
cieties operating under the lodge system. Thus, any contract, tran-
saction, or other arrangement which relieves the insured of the risk
of premature death will fall within the Code's definition of insur-
ance. It is noteworthy that the Commissioner has also ruled that the
statutory exemption from taxation afforded the proceeds of life
insurance issued by the Veterans Administration does not apply
to an "excise imposed upon the transfer of property brought about
by the death of the insured."T
It also is necessary to know when proceeds are receivable by
or for the benefit of the estate. Generally, this test will be met if
the insured's estate will receive any economic benefit from the
proceeds whether by the terms of the policy or not."
Both of these problems are more intricate than first meets the
eye, and they have been given this small space only because a short-
age of time dictates a limitation of this discussion.
B. THE INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP RULE
The first test of when proceeds payable to beneficiaries other
than the decendent's estate are includible in the gross estate is
imposed by the incidents of ownership rule: If the insured possessed
any of the incidents of ownership of the policy, exercisable either
alone or in conjunction with another person, the proceeds will be
included in his gross estate even though they were not receivable
for the benefit of the estate.
The Treasury Department invented this rule in 1930, and
fluctuated between it and the payment of premiums test (or com-
0 Although the Code treats the five percent reversionary interest as an
incident of ownership, the author considers it more helpful to consider
it as a third test.
7Rev. Rul. 55-622, 1955-2, Cum. Bull. 385.
8 See: Proposed Regs. § 20.2042-1(b) (1956); U.S. Treas. Reg. 105 § 81.25;
Hofferbert v. Comm'r, 46 B.T.A. 1101 (1942). But see Flye v. Comm'r, 39
B.T.A. 871 (1939).
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binations of both) until "... . Exasperated by the Treasury's inde-
cisiveness, Congress finally stepped onto the merry-go-round in
1942 and legislated a return once more to a combination of both
criteria."'9 Since its 1930 inception, the incidents of ownership test
has been used for all but six years.10
Because the incidents of ownership rule has existed as a test
for so long, it has become a well defined portion of Estate Tax Law.
As one would expect, the term is not confined to ownership in the
technical legal sense; instead, it includes the right of the insured
or his estate to the economic benefits of the policy."
The courts agree with the Commissioner that the right to
change the primary12 or contingent 13 beneficiaries either alone or
with the consent of another person 14 are incidents of ownership.1
Furthermore, the insured will be deemed to have an incident of
ownership where the right to change the beneficiary is reserved
to a corporation of which he is the sole stockholder.'0 Similarly,
the insured has the incidents of ownership where the proceeds are
payable to a trust and the insured has the right to change the
beneficiary of that trust.17 A more extreme case on the same issue
is Comm'r v. Estate of Karagheusian,s decided on May 7, 1956. In
that case W took out a life insurance policy on her husband, the
decedent. The next year W transferred the policy to a trust which
she had the power to alter or revoke in whole or in part with the
9Yohlin, Life Insurance Planning Under the New Revenue Code, 33
Taxes 450, 451 (1955).
10 1934-37 and 1941-42. See Winkelman, Taxation of Life Insurance under
the Revenue Act of 1954, 28 So. Calif. L. Rev. 348,349 (1955).
11 U.S. Treas. Reg., 105, § 81.27. Proposed Regs., § 20.2042-1 (c) (2) (1956).
12 Estate of Frank H. Knipp, 25 T.C.-, (October 31, 1955). 25.24 P-H
T.C. Rep. Dec. (1955).
13 Broderick v. Keefe, 112 F.2d 293,296 (1st Cir. 1940).
14 Bank of New York v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 375, 385 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); Goldstein's Estate v. United States, 129 Ct. Cl. 264, 122 F. Supp. 677
(1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1954).
15 And this may extend to the retention of the power to change th,
amounts receivable by various beneficiaries. See Josephine P. Hendrick,
P-H 1947 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 47,235, where the power to vary trust income
between members of a group was held to be an attribute of ownership
under Income Tax Law.
16 U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.27; Proposed Regs., § 20.2042-1 (c) (2) (1956).
17 Laird v. Comm'r, 29 B.T.A. 196 (1933), modified on another point, 85
F.2d 598 (3rd Cir. 1936).
18 4A P-H (1956) Fed. Tax Serv. 1 140.267 (2d Cir. 1956).
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consent of her husband and her daughter or their survivor. The
Second Circuit, reversing the Tax Court 9 held that the insured
had an incident of ownership exercisable in conjunction with an-
other person.
20
The courts also agree with the Commissioner that the power
to surrender or cancel2 ' and to pledge or assign 22 are incidents of
ownership. In addition, the courts have considered such factors as
the right to receive distributions in case of disability as incidents
of ownership.23 The fact that the insured does not have possession
of the policy does not affect his retention of incidents of owner-
ship;24 nor is it necessary that he receive the cash surrender value
upon cancellation.
25
Thus, the phrase incidents of ownership as used in its tax law
sense in section 2042 encompasses all of the benefits that an insured
may derive from life insurance.26 And, if an insured is to escape
the incidents of ownership test he must not possess any of the
benefits of the policies on his life. That it is unimportant that he
does not intend to possess any of the incidents of ownership seems
to have been decided by the Tax Court in Collino's Estate27 in
February 1956. To put the Collino case in its proper perspective,
1923 T.C. 806 (1955).
20 "The decedent acting with his wife and daughter had the power at
any time until his death to determine the ultimate distribution of the in-
surance proceeds. This power was an incident of ownership .... To hold
otherwise would be to sanction tax avoidance by means of insubstantial
alterations in the form of ownership." Supra, note 18.
21 Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1928). This case
also determined the constitutionality of the incidents test. The following
sentence is often quoted from page 235: ". . . [T]o free the beneficiaries
of the policy from the possibility its (i.e., the powers to surrender) exer-
cise would seem to be no less a transfer within the reach of the taxing
power than a transfer effected in other ways through death."
22 Caldwell v. Jordan, 119 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ala. 1953).
23 Old Point National Bank v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 343,354 (1939).
24Fried v. Granger, 105 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd per curiam
202 F.2d 150, (3rd Cir. 1953).
25Estate of Selznick v. Comm'r, 15 T.C. 716 (1950), affd per curiam
195 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1952), where the cash surrender value would have
been added to a trust, the income of which was payable to the insured
for life.
26 The possible exception is the peace of mind that comes with knowing
that loved ones are "provided for," if that peace of mind is not destroyed
by the fear of the Sheriff of Nottingham armed with the mighty incidents
of the ownership concept.
27 Estate of Collino, P-H T.C. Rep. Dec. ff 25.115 (1956).
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it is.necessary to first'look at Estate of Doerken v. Comm'r 2s which
was decided by the same court in 1942. The Doerken case held that
where a closely held two-family corporation took out the policy,
paid the premiums, carried the policy as an asset on its books,
retained custody of the policy, and received the entire proceeds,
those proceeds were not includible in the insured's gross estate
even though all of the incidents of ownership were reserved to
the insured by the terms of the policy. The court concluded that
the insured was merely the nominal holders of the rights for the
benefit of the corporation. Similarly, in 1950, the Court of Claims
held29 that proceeds were not includible where the intent of the
parties was for a son who applied for the policy, kept custody of
the policy, and paid all of the premiums to have the incidents of
ownership on the ground that the parties' intent controlled over
the terms of the policy. In that case an insurance agent testified
that he inserted the word "insured" in the blank reserving the
incidents of ownership without instruction in order to clinch the
sale. Both of these cases looked "through the form of the policies
to their substance." In the Collino case, a mother had applied for
insurance on the life of her son; had paid all of the premiums, had
retained possession of the policy, was the beneficiary, and received
all of the proceeds. Yet, this court held that she had failed to
establish the intent that the son should not have the incidents of
ownership which were reserved to him as the "insured" by the
terms of the policies.
In Collino the court distinguished the Metropolitan case on
its facts, placing great weight on the fact that the agent in Metro-
politan had acted in his own best interest and without instruction
from the insured or her son. It is submitted that the agent's action
should make no difference as the parties in both cases failed to give
any instructions to the insurance company or its agent. Thus, the
only difference between these cases is that the agent testified as to
the intent of the parties in the Metropolitan case while in the
Collino case the taxpayer had to rely on overt manifestations of
intent and did not have the aid of a repentant insurance agent.
Admitting that the Metropolitan case is the stronger on its
facts, what more could the taxpayer have done in Collino to es-
tablish that as between the insured and his mother, it was intended
28 46 B.T.A. 809 (1942).
29 National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 773 (Ct.
Cl. 1950).
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that she was the owner of the policies?30 Does this mean that the
Tax Court will not allow the taxpayer to show the intent of the
parties without the aid of direct evidence?
Furthermore, it is submitted that the only material difference
between Estate of Doerken v. Comm'r and the Collino case is the
result. In Doerken, a closely held corporation did everything a cor-
poration would normally do in dealing with a policy it owned; in
Collino, the insured's mother did everything a mother would
normally do in dealing with an insurance policy she owned.
Why did these cases reach opposite results? Because they were
actually different on their facts or because the Tax Court has
decided to prevent life insurance from becoming a haven for tax
avoidance? In the Metropolitan case, the court indicated quite
strongly3' that if a trust instead of life insurance had been involved
the result would have been different because ". . . Trusts are fre-
quently established for the primary purpose of either avoiding
or reducing taxes ... [and] ... the courts have also been inclined
to construe them strictly..." The court also said:
Insurance policies are on a different footing. Through the
history of their development they have contained so many boiler-
plate provisions and fine-print stipulations that the courts through
the years have been inclined to liberally construe them in such a
way as to apply the natural interpretation which the party taking
out the policies had made and his understanding of the purposes
for which the policies were taken out.32 (emphasis supplied)
It is submitted that the footing of life insurance has begun to
crumble and that the Tax Court will soon help the Internal Revenue
Service recoup any loss in revenue that would otherwise have been
caused by the elimination of the premium payment test.3 3 The very
least we can say is that the incidents of ownership rule seems
strong enough to prevent any flagrant tax avoidance.
C. ThE REVERSIONARY INTEREST RULE
Section 2042 created a new test for including the proceeds of
30 The fact that the insurance policies were not before the court in Collino
seems inconsequential as the facts found by the Tax Court include the
terms of the policies necessary to either result.
31 87 F. Supp. at 776.
32 Ibid.
33 See H.R. 1337, supra, note 5, at 3, which predicted a revenue loss of
$25 million in fiscal year 1955 due to the elimination of the premium pay-
ment test.
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life insurance in the insured's gross estate: If the insured possessed
a reversionary interest (whether arising by the express terms of the
policy, or by other instrument, or by operation of law) which ex-
ceeded five percent of the value of the policy immediately before
his death, the proceeds will be included in his gross estate.
Much of the speculation and argument 34 about the meaning
of this new test has been settled by the estate tax regulations
which have been proposed for adoption under the 1954 Code. Sec-
tion 20.2042-1 (c) (3) of these regulations provides that the term
reversionary interest does not include the possibility that the insured
might inherit a policy or its proceeds from another person. Note,
however, that where a policy would return to the insured upon
the prior death of the assignee a reversionary interest would arise,
even though the value of that reversionary interest would not
exceed five percent of the value of the policy if the beneficiary
had the power to defeat the reversion as by surrendering the policy
for its cash value.35
Section 20.2042-1 of the proposed regulations provides by cross
reference to section 20.2037-1 (c) (3) and (4) that the reversionary
interests of life insurance shall be valued, ' insofar as possible, in
the same manner as reversionary interests in other property. Section
20.2037-1 (c) (3) provides that the reversionary interest will be
valued in accordance with recognized valuation principles: Where
actuarial principles can be applied this is to be done in accordance
with the rules of section 20.2031-7 (d).36 Where the interest is not
subject to valuation by actuarial principles that interest will be
valued at its fair market value as described in section 20.2031-1 (b).
According to that section, ". . . The fair market value is the price
at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or
34 See, for example: Casner, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Estate
Planning, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 222, 255 (1955); Mannheimer, Wheeler and
Friedman, Gifts of Life Insurance by the Insured, N.Y.U. 13th Inst. on
Fed. Tax 247, 250-253 (1955); Waldo, Life Insurance and Annuities Under
the 1954 Revenue Code, 1955 U. Ill. L. Forum 380, 398.
35The effect of this provision of Proposed Regs. § 20.2042-1 is to make
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042 more like § 2037 than is required by the
wording of those sections. However, this treatment seems to be in line
with the intention of Congress to make the treatment of life insurance
analogous to that of other property. See, Mannheimer, Wheeler and Fried-
man, op. cit. supra, note 34, at 250-253.
36This paragraph explains the mechanics of determining the value of
remainders of reversionary interests from the two tables which are part
of the section.
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to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."
And, section 20.2042-1 (c) (3) provides that any powers held by
others which would affect the value of the reversionary interest
must be specifically taken into consideration.
Section 20.2037-1 (c) (4) of the proposed regulations purports to
describe the method for determining whether the reversionary
interest exceeds five percent of the value of the transferred prop-
erty. The rule of this paragraph 37 is not very helpful when applied
to life insurance where it may be important to know whether the
replacement cost, the cash value, or some other value is to be used.
Admittedly, this problem does not arise where the value of the
reversionary interest can be determined by actuarial principles for
the problem may then be stated in terms of whether the decedent
had a one-in-twenty chance of reacquiring the policy, regardless
of its value.38 However, if a reversionary interest has a fair market
value even though its value cannot be determined by actuarial
principles, it will be necessary to know what the basis of valuation
of the policy is in order to determine whether that fair market
value exceeds five percent of the value of the policy.39
Like most innovations in the law, all of the effects of the
reversionary interest rule will not be known until it has been put
to the tests of practice.
II. THE APPLICATION OF OTHER SECTIONS
A. SEcTIoN 2035: TRANSFERS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH
Even if the proceeds of life insurance are not includible in the
decedent's gross estate under section 2042, they may be so included
under another section of the Code.40 Of primary importance in this
regard is section 2035 which deals with transfers in contemplation
of death. The value of all property transferred in contemplation of
37 -... the value of the reversionary interest is compared with the value
of the transferred property, including interests therein which are not
dependent upon survivorship of the decedent. .. " Proposed Reg. § 20-2037-
l(c) (4)(1956).
83 Waldo, op. cit. supra note 34, at 398.
3 9 Waldo, ibid, is contra. Also, the "Report of the Life Insurance and
Annuities Committee of the New York State Bar Association on H. R.
8300", as quoted by Mannheimer, Wheeler and Friedman, op cit. supra
note 34 at 251, for the proposition that the concept of the "value of the
policy" should be eliminated as it is unnecessary and ambiguous. Note, how-
ever, that both assume the reversionary interest can be valued by actuarial
principles, and to the extent that this can be done, this writer is in accord.
40Proposed Regs. § 20.2042-1(a)(2)(1956).
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death is included within the gross estate except the value of that
property which was transferred for adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth. Furthermore, section 2035 establishes
a rebuttable presumption that all transfers made within three years
of death are made in contemplation of death.
Contemplation of death is defined by the proposed regulations
as follows:
The phrase "in contemplation of death" . . . does not have ref-
erence to that general expectation of death such as all persons
entertain. On the other hand, its meaning is not restricted to an
apprehension that death is imminent or near. A transfer "in con-
templation of death" is a disposition of property prompted by the
thought of death (although it need not be solely so prompted).41
The application of this definition has given rise to much litiga-
tion, and it will undoubtedly continue to do so as this is another
area where the facts make the law in any particular case. Generally,
the same tests which are applied to transfers of other property are
applied to transfers of life insurance to determine whether the
transfer was made in contemplation of death. However, the testa-
mentary nature of life insurance makes the application of the gen-
eral tests more difficult. 42 As the intricacies of this concept make
it a subject unto itself, only the general picture will be set forth
here. What is probably the most important single lesson in this
area was put quite well by Judge Kern, who, after describing a
man who was 94 years old when he died, said:
This portrait may not be an accurate likeness of the real
Oliver Johnson. It is possible that the verbal picture of Oliver
created at the trial by the testimony of witnesses brought out by
skillful guidance of petitioner's counsel emphasized certain of
his features and left others in shadow to the extent that the Oliver
Johnson of the verbal portrait has more resemblance to a synthesis
of decendents whose transfers have been held in many reported
cases to have been made not in contemplation of death than to
the real Oliver Johnson who transferred real estate .... But thejudicial process requires that we create our image of Oliver from
the material in the record before us. We cannot be certain that
our portrait of Oliver is a lifelike replica of the real Oliver but
41 Proposed Regs. § 20.2035-1(c) (1956).
421 Polisher, Estate Planning and Estate Tax Saving 83 (1948). The
testamentary nature of life insurance will be considered in determining
the motive of the transferor. However, "... the testamentary nature . . .
does not necessarily mean that the motive actuating the transfer is like-
wise testamentary in nature.. .." Cronin's Estate v. Comm'r, 164 F.2d 561,565
(6th Cir. 1947).
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we are confident that it accurately reflects the portrait of Oliver
drawn by the evidence in the record. 43
Thus, the advocate must take the time to learn all of the facts
and circumstances surrounding any transfer made within three
years of the decedent's death so that he may present them in the
light most favorable to his client. On the other hand, the estate
planner should emphasize all aspects of transfers that are associated
with life and see that the evidence of these aspects is carefully
preserved.
In addition, the estate planner may find it advantageous to
have the transferee pay the premium for at least three years after
the transfer. This will take advantage of the doctrine announced
in Liebmann v. Hassett44 which allows that portion of the proceeds
attributable to the transferee's payment of premiums to be excluded
from the gross estate. This doctrine is based on the theory that the
value of the decedent's gross estate should not be increased by the
transferee's enhancement of the value of the property.45 Thus, if
the transfer of the policy is determined to be in contemplation of
death, the transferee's having paid the premiums will result in a
tax saving.
This brings us to another problem presented by section 2035:
Suppose that an insured died more than three years after he trans-
ferred a policy and that he continued to pay the premiums until
his death. Suppose also that the advocate was unable to rebut the
presumption that the premium payments during the last three
years of decedent's life were made in contemplation of death. Is
there to be included in the decendent's gross estate only the amount
of the premiums paid, or such portion of the proceeds as the
premiums paid within the three year period bears to the total
premiums paid?
The consensus of the commentators appears to be that the
pro rata amount of the proceeds will be included in the gross
estate.40 This result is reached by reasoning backwards from Lieb-
mann v. Hassett, supra. Reduced to its simplest form this view is:
Because the gross estate is credited with the proportional amount
of the proceeds attributable to premiums paid by the transferee
when the transfer of the policy is found to be in contemplation of
43 Estate of Oliver Johnson v. Comm'r, 10 T.C. 680, 691 (1948).
44 148 F.2d 247,251 (1st Cir. 1945).
45 U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.15; Proposed Regs. § 20.2035-1(e) (1956).
46 Freyburger, Gifts of Life Insurance, 94 Trusts & Estates 476, 478 (1955),
where he quotes Mannheimer, Wheeler and Friedman, 1955 Ins. L.J.
153, 159, for this same proposition.
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death, the gross estate should include the amount of the proceeds
which are attributable to premium payments which were made in
contemplation of death.
Thus reduced, the reasoning appears to be wrong. First of all,
it should be noted that the conclusion is not a logical necessity
of the Liebmann pro rata rule because that rule deals with transfers
of policies made in contemplation of death, while the transfers in
the hypothetical are payments of premiums made in contemplation
of death. Secondly, the Liebmann rule was based on a policy against
charging the estate with enhancement of value caused by the trans-
feree, and that policy has no application here. Thirdly, "it does not
follow that merely because a donor pays an obligation of the donee
and prevents a policy from lapsing, or a mortgage from being in
default, or a leasehold from being forfeited, that he has made a
gift of the proportionate part of the property."47
Arguments against the inclusion of any part of the proceeds
can also be drawn by analogy to other parts of the law; e.g., the
insured's estate is depleted only in the amount of the premium;
48
the increase in value was more like income than appreciation in
value; 49 and,. the majority of states will only let the creditors of
insolvent insured's reach the premiums.50 It may also be argued
that to include the proportional amount of the proceeds is to
resurrect the premium payment test, contrary to the intent of
Congress.51
On the other hand, Warren and Surrey suggest that even more
than the proportional amount of the proceeds of the policy may be
includible where the insured paid most of the premiums but only
one of them in contemplation of death:
... The argument would run as follows: in paying a premium
within three years of his death the decedent insured kept alive
the right to collect the entire proceeds of the policy at his death, and
to the extent that the proceeds are attributable to premiums that
he paid they should be included in his gross estate. Since this
argument does not conflict with the premium payment test or with
the policy reasons motivating the enactment of the provision that
is now 2035 (b), it might succeed. 52
47 Ibid.
48 Cf. E.T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 166.
49 Cf. Harvey v. United States, 185 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1950).
50 Cf. 24 Am. Jur., Fraudulent Conveyances, § 90, 240 (1939).
51 Yohlin, op. cit. supra note 9, 456.
52 Warren and Surrey, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, Cases and Ma-
terials 530 (1956 ed.).
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Because the proposed regulations shed no light on this problem
area, we may assume that it will be before the courts in the not-
too-distant future. This assumption will probably be valid even
though the entire issue may be avoided if the insured makes cash
gifts and lets someone else pay the premiums.
B. SECTION 2036: TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED LIFE ESTATES
In certain situations the Commissioner also is able to argue
that the proceeds of life insurance are includible in the gross
estate under section 2036-transfers with retained life estates. The
argument arises from insurance companies' issuing single premium
life policies to persons who are otherwise uninsurable if those
persons relieve the company of the risk by the simultaneous pur-
chase of an annuity.53 Where the risk element was so eliminated,
the Supreme Court held that the policy and the annuity were
inseparable and that the insurance part of the combination was not
insurance within the meaning of the Federal Estate Tax.5 Using
that decision as a lever, the Commissioner then argued that since
the insurance and the annuity were inseparable, a transfer of the
policy was just another transfer with a retained life estate and
was, therefore, includible in the decedents gross estate under sec-
tion 2036. This argument prevailed in the second 5 and sixth5 6
circuits as well as in the tax court.57 However, the seventh circuit
refused to follow.58 In specifically refusing to follow the other
circuits, this court distinguished Le Gierse and held that the two
contracts were in fact separable, that the annuity was neither based
nor dependent upon the policy, and that the proceeds of the policy
3 The remainder of the annuity at the time of decedent's death is pay-
able to the company and used to pay the proceeds of the policy. In 1952,
no less than 14 U.S. insurance companies issued this combination, and dur-
ing September 1952, Prudential Life Insurance Company of America had
1,694 of these contracts in force providing insurance of almost thirty-one
and one quarter million dollars. Note, 62 Yale L. J. 822 (1953).
54 Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941), the taxpayer arguing that
it was insurance in an effort to take advantage of the then existing $40,000
exemption.
55 Burr v. Comm'r, 156 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1946).
5 Conway v. Glenn, 193 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1952).
57 Estate of Reynolds v. Comm'r, 45 B.T.A. 44 (1941).
s Bohnen v. Harrison, 199 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1952), decided 2-1 with Judge
Duffy dissenting.
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were not includible in the gross estate merely because of the annuity.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 9 but divided equally6 0 and
would not allow a rehearing. 1 Thus, the issue is still undecided.
The new regulations state that ".... [A] contract under which the
death benefit could never exceed the total premium paid, plus
interest, contains no element of insurance,"6 2 but they are otherwise
silent on this problem. The most recent case in this area is Fidelity-
Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith,63 which was decided by a district
court 64 in the third circuit on June 27, 1956. In holding that the
proceeds of the policy which had been transferred were not in-
cludible in the gross estate, Judge Kraft relied heavily on the rea-
soning of the seventh circuit in Bohnen.
C. SECTION 2037: TRANSFERS EFFECTIVE AT DEATH
It should be noted that a third alternative to holding that the
proceeds are either includible or not includible is to hold that they
are partially includible under section 2037-transfers taking effect
at death.65 This view divides the value of the proceeds into (a)
the amount of the cash value just before decedent's death, and (b)
the difference between the cash value just before death and its
face value; excluding the cash value on the theory that its transfer
was complete and could have been realized at any time before
death, and including the remainder on the theory that it could be
obtained only by surviving the decedent. However, this argument
overlooks the fact that section 2037 will not apply unless a reversion-
ary interest is found, and that the retention of income alone does
not constitute such a reversionary interest. Thus, if no other
reverter is found, this argument will fail.66
59 345 U.S. 903 (1953).
60 345 U.S. 946 (1953).
61345 U.S. 978 (1953).
62 proposed Regs. § 20.2039-1(d). See also: § 20.2042-1(a)(2).
63 142 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
64 Ibid.
65 Note, 62 Yale L.J. 822,830 (1953), suggests this argument under Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 811(c) (B).
66 Note that neither § 2037 nor § 2038 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 will
normally be applied to life insurance policies as similar provisions are
contained in § 2042.
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III. SUMMARY
By way of summary, let us look at the problems that are pre-
sented by the 1954 Code's treatment of life insurance: First, the
term insurance is used in its broadest sense. Second, if the decedent's
estate will receive any benefit from the insurance, the proceeds
must be included in the gross estate. Third, the proceeds will be
included in the gross estate even though they are payable to other
beneficiaries if at the time of his death the decedent had any of the
incidents of ownership which, as we have seen, include any eco-
nomic benefit whether the insured intended to have that benefit
or not. And, fourth, the proceeds will be included in the decedent's
gross estate if he retains a reverter which exceeds five percent of
the value of the policy. Even if the estate planner is able to take
insurance out of the reach of section 2042, his plan may still fall
short of the desired tax savings under the sections of the Code deal-
ing with contemplation of death, retained life estate, or transfers
taking effect at death.
Thus, when the estate planner is deciding whether to suggest
the transfer of life insurance for the purpose of an estate tax sav-
ing, he must first determine that on his particular set of facts, it
will be possible to escape all of these tests.
In addition, the estate planner must try to predict the effect
any possible change in the Code's treatment of life insurance
would have upon his particular transfer. This question may be char-
acterized in many different ways6 7 but the basic question always
remains the same: To what extent should life insurance be taxed?
The answer depends upon such factors as who benefits when in-
surance is not taxed; should they be allowed so to benefit, or should
the benefit be spread across the board by a reduction in the rate
of taxation; does the difference have a beneficial effect on the
nation's economy, etc. These factors lie in the complex area of
social economics. They are left to the estate planner and his imag-
ination.
Howard E. Tracy, '57
67 A partial collection is found in the American Law Institute Proceedings
(32d Annual Meeting) p. 101-20 which appears in Warren and Surrey,
op. cit. supra, note 52, at p. 513ff.
